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No JOY IN MUDVILLE 1 FOR THE FIRST

AMENDMENT: A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION OF THE PUBLIC FORUM
DOCTRINE IN LIGHT OF UNITED
CHURCH OF CHRIST V. GATEWAY
INTRODUCTION

Like many American cities, Cleveland, Ohio has a community
identity that is entwined with its professional sports teams. Franchises
like the Cleveland Indians or the Boston Red Sox are not just dueling
corporations competing with each other in the free market. While
professional sports teams are lucrative businesses, they also express
an idea about a city's public identity.2 In this respect, expressing ideas
about professional sports teams is political speech. Team names and3
logos have an effect on how the local community characterizes itself.
In Cleveland, the use of the team name the "Indians" and its
mascot, Chief Wahoo, continues to outrage those who believe that the
name and mascot degrade Native Americans. The Ohio Supreme
Court recently described the Chief Wahoo logo as "a red-faced,

I This phrase is borrowed from the famous poem by Ernest Lawrence Thayer, Casey at
the Bat, S.F. EXAMINER, June 3, 1888, reprintedin BASEBALL: A LITERARY ANTHOLOGY 13-15
(Nicholas Dawidoff ed., 2002).
2 See,
e.g.,
Cleveland
Indians
Official
Website,
Jacob's Field
History,

http://cleveland.indians.nlb.comNASApp/mlb/cle/ballparkfindex.jsp (last visited Mar. 7, 2006)
("There is a passionate connection between the city of Cleveland and the Indians, as they are a

study in revival. Both are working, living examples of the power of teamwork, conviction and
dedication.").
3 For example, the professional basketball team, the Baltimore Bullets, changed its name
after the team moved to Washington D.C. The name change occurred, in part, due to the fact
that Washington D.C. was known for its high homicide rate. See Richard Justice, Bullets Seek
New Name; Pollin Says Moniker Is Inappropriate,WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1995, at Cl. In re-

marking on how involved the public was in the name changing process, the team owner said,
"What really fills my heart is how the community is so involved with my team ....They like
the names. They don't like them. They were involved enough to be part of it. They wanted to
put their two cents in." Richard Justice, ForBullets, 'Wizards' Casts Magic Spell, WASH. POST,

Feb. 23, 1996, at Al.
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hooked-nosed, grinning caricature of a Native American." 4 However,
there are many local residents who embrace the team's name and
mascot and would be disappointed to see them change. For the last
several years, a group of protestors has staged demonstrations at the
Indians' home opener. These protests have sparked ongoing legal
controversy between the protestors and the owners of Jacobs Field,
where the Indians play ball.6 Jacobs Field is part of a twenty-eight
acre area in downtown Cleveland known as Gateway. The private
Gateway Redevelopment Corporation owns and operates Gateway,
but its long and complex relationship with State, County, and City
governments has blurred the distinction between the public and
private sector.
Recently, the Sixth Circuit decided a First Amendment
controversy involving anti-Wahoo protestors who were prevented
from protesting at Gateway. 7 Applying the public forum doctrine 8 to
the disputed areas, the Sixth Circuit found that Gateway could not
prohibit speech on the sidewalks owned by the Gateway
Redevelopment Corporation, but that prohibiting speech in a large
urban area known as the Gateway Commons was not unconsitutional
under the First Amendment. 9

4 Bellecourt v. City of Cleveland, 820 N.E.2d 309, 311 n. 1 (Ohio 2004).
5 See Evelyn Theiss, Tribe Fans Hail Decision on Mascot, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),

July 1, 1993, at LA.
6 The most recently decided case, Bellecourt, involved a 1998 incident in which five protestors burned an effigy of Chief Wahoo and were arrested for arson. Although the protestors
spent the night in jail, they were never formally charged. They subsequently filed a suit charging
the police with violating their First Amendment right to speech, likening their arrest to that of
arresting one burning the flag. The Ohio Supreme Court decided in favor of the City, saying,
"Though we generally agree with this [First Amendment] proposition, we find it inapplicable
here because any suppression of speech was incidental to Cleveland's important interest in
preventing harm caused by fire." Bellecourt, 820 N.E.2d at 312. The two dissenting opinions
found the arrests had violated the protestors' First Amendment right to expression. See id. at
314-15.
7 United Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp. of Greater Cleveland, 383 F.3d
449 (6th Cir. 2004).
8 The public forum doctrine is a judicial device that the Court uses in First Amendment
cases to determine under what circumstances government must make public property available
for speech.
9 While the Gateway Redevelopment Corporation, a private entity, owns Gateway, the
City's relationship with the Gateway Redevelopment Corporation has raised a question as to
whether the Gateway Redevelopment Corporation is a state actor for purposes of the First
Amendment. At the District Court level, the Plaintiffs made two arguments supporting a conclusion that Gateway is a state actor. First, they argued that "because ... its history, mandate and
leadership are so tied up with the government-in this case the City and the County-that
[Gateway] should be deemed an agency or instrumentality of local, and therefore state government." Id. at 454 (second alteration in original). Second, "the relationship between the Gateway
Corporation, the City and the County is so deeply symbiotic as to make the Gateway Corporation a state actor." Id. This explains the grounds for plaintiffs' First Amendment claim.
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This Note addresses the consequences of misapplying the public
forum doctrine to First Amendment questions. The Sixth Circuit
applied the public forum doctrine in a manner that is antithetical to
the underlying values behind the First Amendment. This decision
means (1) the public is prevented from access to core political speech
and (2) people who want to convey a political message to the public
are unduly inhibited from engaging in self-expression and
contributing to the democratic process.
There are two major problems with the Sixth Circuit's use of the
public forum doctrine in the Gateway case. First, the court's use of
the traditional approach to the public forum doctrine results in a
formalistic outcome that does not adequately protect speech. The
court should have examined Gateway's no protest restriction in light
of whether the type of expression (here, peaceful demonstration with
signs) is compatible with the uses of the property. Using the
compatibility approach, the court should have found that Gateway
could not restrict the type of speech activity in which the protestors
wanted to engage. Second, the court should have found that
Gateway's speech restrictions are tantamount to viewpoint
discrimination. Gateway's practice of allowing signs endorsing the
team name and mascot into the forum while prohibiting messages
with a critical viewpoint is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
With this decision, the Sixth Circuit embarks down a path that will
erode the substantive underpinnings of the First Amendment.
This Note argues that the only way to use the public forum
doctrine without betraying the values underlying the First
Amendment is by applying a flexible compatibility model that
scrupulously guards against viewpoint-based discrimination. If the
public forum doctrine is here to stay, courts must employ it in such a
way that the First Amendment does not become ancillary to the
discussion.
Part I sets the stage by providing the factual backdrop against
which the Sixth Circuit's public forum analysis took place. Part II
provides the necessary doctrinal background to understand what the
Sixth Circuit did (and what it did not do) in the Gateway case. This
Section generally explains the public forum doctrine, examines the
two competing public forum models, and analyzes the requirement of
viewpoint neutrality in all forums. Part 11 argues that by using the
traditional approach and not critically examining whether there was
viewpoint discrimination, the Sixth Circuit got it wrong.
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I. FACTS OF GATEWAY CASE
The controversy began in April 2000 when a group of people,
including the plaintiff group, United Church of Christ (UCC), planned
a peaceful protest at the Cleveland Indians' home opener. The
protestors believe that the team's name and mascot are racist and
should not be used as symbols of community pride.' ° Not
surprisingly, the protestors planned to have their protest outside
Jacobs Field, the stadium where the Cleveland Indians play their
home games." Jacobs Field, which is part of the Gateway Sports
Complex, is owned by the Gateway Economic Development
Corporation of Greater Cleveland, Inc., a private company.' 2 The
Complex also consists of the Quicken Loans Arena (where the
Gateway-owned sidewalks, a Commons
Cleveland Cavaliers play),
t3
area, and a parking area.
This was not the first time the protestors had staged a
demonstration outside an Indians game. In the past, the protestors and
Gateway had been able to come to mutually acceptable terms
regarding where the protestors could demonstrate in certain areas at
Gateway.' 4 But this time there was no compromise. Gateway would
not allow the protestors to demonstrate on the Gateway sidewalks or
on the Commons at the home opener. 15 In response, the protestors
filed suit in United States District Court asking for an injunction that
them to gather and demonstrate at the Gateway
would allow
6
Complex.'
At first blush, the case looked like it would primarily involve an
issue of state action, i.e., was Gateway a government actor, or was
Gateway private and, thus, not subject to the First Amendment? 7 But
the district court and the Sixth Circuit took a different approach.
Assuming that there was state action, the courts applied the public
10See Jon Craig, High Court Rejects Wahoo-Burners' Plea; Justices Say Threat from
Burning of Effigy Overrides Protesters' Free-Speech Rights, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 16,
2004, at IOC (describing signs and banners that were displayed at a similar demonstration to
protest the "baseball team's continuing use of a grinning caricature of an American Indian as its
corporate logo," because "the picture of the red-faced Indian [is considered to be] racist").
I Gateway, 383 F.3d at 451.
12 Id.
13Id. (referring to Quicken Loans Arena by its previous name, Gund Arena).
14See Mark Rollenhagen, Gateway, ProtestersAgree on 2 Sites, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 6, 1995, at 2B (outlining the terms of a 1995 settlement agreement in another First
Amendment lawsuit between protestors and Gateway).
15Gateway prohibits "all persons from using the Gateway Sidewalk or the Commons to
solicit, advertise, or protest (save for three exceptions unimportant to our resolution of this
case)." Gateway, 383 F.3d at 451.
16 Id.
17 See supra note 9.
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forum doctrine to the disputed areas.' 8 Under this approach, if the
regulation was constitutional even with state action, there would be
no reason to decide whether or not there was, in fact, state action.
Unfortunately, the manner in which the Sixth Circuit used the public
forum doctrine diverted attention from the real First Amendment
issues that the case implicated and, as a result, core political speech is
(and will continue to be) unnecessarily restricted. To understand what
the Sixth Circuit did in the Gateway case, a brief discussion of some
relevant analytical concepts will be helpful.
II. DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND

The Gateway decision hinged on the Sixth Circuit's application of
the public forum doctrine. While there are certain universal aspects of
the public forum doctrine (described below in Section A), there are
two distinct schools of thought on why the public forum doctrine
exists and how it should be applied. These two lines of reasoning,
known as the traditional approach and the compatability approach
(both laid out in Section B), have dramatically different analytical
underpinnings. Both approaches to the public forum doctrine are also
concerned with viewpoint neutrality. While the public forum doctrine
does allow for content-based restrictions in specified circumstances,
the government is never allowed to impose viewpoint-based
restrictions (discussed in Section C). The public forum doctrine works
as it should only when courts use a compatibility approach that
scrupulously guards against viewpoint discrimination.
A. The Public Forum Doctrine:The Three Categories
The public forum doctrine essentially asks the question: "[w]hat
places are available for speech?" 19 Stripped to its most basic
elements, the doctrine starts with the premise that public property can
be divided into three different categories-the classic public forum,
the designated public forum, and the nonpublic forum. Each kind of
forum is treated differently for purposes of the First Amendment. In a
classic public forum, prohibitions on speech will not be upheld unless
they pass strict scrutiny, whereas in a nonpublic forum, speech
prohibitions need only be reasonable to pass constitutional muster. As
a result, whether a restriction on speech is permissible under the First

is See Gateway, 383 F.3d at 451-52.
19ERwlN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1082 (2d ed. 2002).
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Amendment will depend, in large part, on what type of forum the
court decides is being regulated.20
Despite wide and long-standing criticism that the public forum
doctrine fails to accomplish its objectives,2 ' and lacks coherence 22 or
constitutional justification, 3 courts' continued use of the public
forum in deciding First Amendment cases indicates that it is not going
away anytime soon.24 What prompted courts to begin talking in this
public forum language? Before the public forum doctrine, the
Supreme Court had engaged in an ad hoc approach to the First
Amendment, making exception after exception to the general rule that
government could not restrict speech based on content.25 The public
forum doctrine developed as an analytical tool that enabled courts to
acknowledge that, under some circumstances, the state may make
content-based speech restrictions on government property.26 The
doctrine eliminates the earlier ad hoc approach by creating clear
categories, differentiating between areas where the state has a
stronger interest in making content-based regulations and areas where
the government's interest in restricting speech is weaker.27
20This has led two scholars to refer to the public forum doctrine as "the 'geographical'
approach to first amendment law." Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature
of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L.
REv. 1219, 1220 (1984); see also Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The
History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713, 1715 (1987) ("In general
outline, [public forum] rules focus tightly 'on the character of the property at issue."').
21 See, e.g., Farber & Nowak, supra note 20, at 1224 ("Classifying a medium of
communication as a public forum may cause legitimate governmental interests to be
thoughtlessly brushed aside; classifying it as something other than a public forum may lead
courts to ignore the incompatibility of the challenged regulations with first amendment
values.").
22 See, e.g., id. at 1223 ("Perhaps there is a defensible distinction between leafletting on
the steps of the Supreme Court and on the adjoining sidewalk, or between an educational institution's restrictions on access to unused classrooms and to faculty mailboxes, but the distinctions
are more subtle than public forum analysis would indicate.").
23 See, e.g., Post, supra note 20, at 1715 ("The Court has yet to articulate a defensible
constitutional justification for its basic project of dividing government property into distinct
categories, much less for the myriad of formal rules governing the regulation of speech within
these categories.").
2 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (using public forum
analysis to decide whether public libraries' use of filtering devices for the Internet violated the
First Amendment); United Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp. of Greater Cleveland,
383 F.3d 449 (6th Cir. 2004).
25 See Farber & Nowak, supra note 20, at 1226-27 (describing the Court's analytical
framework for answering First Amendment questions prior to its use of the public forum
doctrine).
26 See id. at 1220.
27 See id. at 1221 (arguing that with its decision in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971), the Court's general ad hoc approach to the First Amendment was effectively eliminated
in favor of a categorical framework). From an historical perspective, the categorical approach
can be viewed as more protective of speech in that the Court's earlier ad hoc approach had been
largely deferential to the legislature. In contrast, after Cohen, the Court made it clear that for

2006]

NO JOY IN MUDVILLE FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT

1153

Although the public forum doctrine claims to derive its legitimacy
from earlier roots, the Court did not speak in the public forum
vernacular until the 1970s. Perry Education Association v. Perry
Local Educators' Association28 provides the most concise definition
and test for each forum. Each category is explicated below.
29

1. The Classic Public Forum

Of the three fora, the Court is most protective of speech in the
classic public forum. A classic public forum is one which "by long
tradition or by government fiat ha[s] been devoted to assembly and
debate., 30 The idea behind the classic public forum derives from
Justice Roberts' famous dictum in Hague v. CIO,3 1 that streets, parks
and sidewalks 32 "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of
the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. 33
In a classic public forum, "the rights of the State to limit
expressive activity are sharply circumscribed. ' 34 The Court does not
allow blanket prohibitions or content-based restrictions on speech in
the classic forum unless there is a compelling government interest and
the prohibition/regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve that
compelling interest.3 5 Content neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions, however, are only subjected to intermediate scrutiny. In
other words, a content neutral restriction in the classic forum will
only be upheld if it is "narrowly tailored to serve a significant

government to restrict speech based on its content, the speech would have to fall into a clearly
defined category of unprotected speech.
28 460 U.S. 37 (1983).

29This forum has also been referred to as the traditional public forum and the quintessential public forum. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985) (traditional); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(quintessential).
30 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
31 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
32While Hague originally only referred to streets and parks, the Court later asserted that
the Hague dictum was also meant to encompass sidewalks. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480
(1988) ("'[Tlime out of mind' public streets and sidewalks have been used for public assembly
and debate, the hallmarks of a traditional public forum."); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171
(1983) (holding that the public sidewalk surrounding the Supreme Court is a classic public
forum). But see United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (holding that a postal sidewalk
designed exclusively as a means of ingress and egress to the post office is not a classic public
forum).
33 Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
34 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
35 Id.
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government interest, and leave[s] open ample alternative channels of
communication. 36
37

2. The DesignatedPublic Forum

A designated public forum is "public property which the State has
opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity. 3 8
Unlike a classic forum, the government is not required to open such
property for speech purposes, but once it does, it must comply with
the same standards as it does in the classic public forum. 39 Speech
prohibitions and content-based restrictions must be narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling governmental interest.4a Content neutral time,
place, and manner restrictions are only allowed if they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and allow for
ample alternative channels of communication. 4'
3. The Nonpublic Forum
The nonpublic forum represents the least speech-protected
category of government property. If an area is deemed a nonpublic
forum, then "[iln addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the
State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative
or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not
an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker's view.",42 In other words, the government may
restrict or even prohibit speech in a nonpublic forum so long as the
regulation is reasonable and viewpoint neutral.
The underlying rationale behind giving the government greater
latitude in the nonpublic forum is the Court's recognition that the
"First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply
because it is owned or controlled by the government.' 43 The
reasonableness standard highly defers to the government. As a result,
if the Court finds the regulated area to be a nonpublic forum, the
regulation will usually be upheld. 44 A finding of a nonpublic forum is,
36

Id.

37 This forum is also referred to as the limited public forum. See, e.g., Cornelius v.

NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, >.TT.S. 788, 811(1985).
38 Perry,460 U.S. at 45.
39 Id. at 45-46.
40 Id. at 46.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.

114, 129 (1981)).
44 See, e.g., Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789 (1984); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.

2006]

NO JOY IN MUDVILLE FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT

1155

therefore, usually fatal to a First Amendment challenge. When the
Court finds a nonpublic forum, it is, in essense, writing the
government a "blank check" to control expression. a5
B. Public Forum Doctrine: One Phrase,Two Different Concepts
The phrase "public forum doctrine" is used to describe two very
different analytical models: the traditional framework and the
compatiblity framework. Both approaches use the three categories
described in the preceding section, but the way in which the
categories are employed dramatically differs under the two
paradigms. As will be seen, the compatiblity model is superior to the
traditional model as a tool for analyzing First Amendment questions.
While the traditional model unnecessarily imposes formalistic
boundaries on the right to expression, the compatibility model creates
a delicate balance; it reinforces the values underlying the First
Amendment while acknowledging that in extraordinary circumstances
other governmental interests trump the right to information and
expression.
1. The TraditionalApproach: Property-BasedReasoning
The traditional approach can be traced back to the nineteenth
century case, Davis v. Massachusetts,46 in which the Supreme Court
upheld an ordinance restricting speech on the Boston Common. 47 In
Davis, the Court's property-based reasoning was that since the
government owned the Common, it, like any private owner, could
forbid any public use of the Common.48 The Court went on to assert
that the greater right to prohibit all public use of the property must
include the lesser right to prohibit speech activity on the property. 49
This reasoning expresses the idea that the First Amendment is nothing
more than a negative liberty-that while government cannot interfere
with one's right to speak,5 ° it is not required to affirmatively make its
property available for speech activity.

114 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
45 Post, supranote 20, at 1764.
- 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
47 Id. at 48.
8

Id.

49Id.
50 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.").
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Later, the Hague dictum 51 provided a contour to the absolutist
approach articulated in Davis. Like the Davis decision, Hague's logic
stemmed from property-based reasoning.52 But rather than find that
the government's ownership status gave it the absolute right to
exclude, the Hague dictum recognized that with respect to streets,
parks, and sidewalks, the people had obtained "a kind of FirstAmendment easement. 5 3 As a result of this metaphorical easement,
the Hague dictum concluded that there was a category of public
property (albeit a limited category) in which the government does
have an affirmative, if conditional, duty to keep property open for
speech purposes. In streets, parks, and sidewalks, therefore, the
government does not have unfettered power to restrict speech. And
thus, the classic public forum was born. 54
While there was a brief period when it appeared that the Court was
moving away from the traditional approach and towards the
compatibiblity approach, 55 Greer v. Spock5 6 firmly entrenched the
traditional approach into the Court's analytical toolbox. 57 Greer
involved a regulation of speech on Fort Dix, a military base, which
was generally open to the public.58 Spock, a presidential candidate,
was prevented from giving a campaign speech, though in the past
59
speakers had been permitted on the base to talk about other subjects.
In analyzing whether the restriction violated the First Amendment,
the Court rejected the compatibilty approach. Instead, the Greer
majority asked whether there was a tradition of military bases serving
as locations for speech. 60 Echoing the property-based rationale that
had developed from the Davis line of cases, the Greer majority
explained:
The guarantees of the First Amendment have never meant
"that people who want to propagandize protests or views have
a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and
51 See supra Part BI.A.1.
52 Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. Cr. REV. 233,
238 (explaining that the dictum "implict[ly] accept[s] the underlying premise of the [Davis]
position-that the public forum issue must be defined in terms of the common law property
rights of the state").
53 Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT.
REv. 1, 13; see also Stone, supra note 52, at 238.
54 The classic public forum is discussed supra Part BI.A. I.
55 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); see also infra Part ll.B.2.
56 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
57 See Post, supra note 20, at 1739-41.
58 Greer,424 U.S. at 830.
59 Id. at 831-32.
60 Id. at 838.
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wherever they please.",6 1 "The State, no less than a private
owner of property, has power to preserve the property under
62
its controlfor the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.,
Because military bases did not have a history of "serv[ing] as place[s]
for free public assembly and communication, '6 3 the Court asked only
whether the regulation was reasonable. 64 Answering in the affirmative, the Court found that the regulation did not violate the First
Amendment.65 Since the Greer decision, the traditional approach has
garnered significant support as a method for analyzing First Amendment questions.
Under the traditional approach, the Court has interpreted the designated public forum in such a way as to strip it of any substantive
meaning. A designated public forum is "public property which the
State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity." 66 Under the traditional approach, where a plaintiff argues
that the restricted property is a designated public forum, the Court
addresses the argument by looking at the government's subjective
intent in opening the property. 67 While this focus on government intent is not an inherent feature of the traditional approach, it has clearly
become a part of how the traditional proponents examine designated
public forum questions. The underlying premise behind examining
government intent is that "[t]he government does not create a [designated] public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse,
but only by68 intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
discourse."
The Court has defended the government intent requirement on the
grounds of "general access" versus "selective access." 69 On this view,
"the government creates a designated public forum when it makes its
property generally available to a certain class of speakers." 70 However, where government "does no more than reserve eligibility for
access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members
must then, as individuals, 'obtain permission,' to use it," a designated

62

Id. at 836 (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966)).
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47).

63

Id. at 838.

64

Id.

61

65 Id.
6 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see also
supra Part nl.A.2.
67 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 850 (1985).
6 Id. at 802.
69 Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679-80 (1998).
70 Id. at 679.
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public forum is not created. 7' If the government faces an "all-ornothing" proposition, it might choose not to open the property up for
any speech purposes whatsoever. 72 By restricting the designated public forum label to those instances where the government has allowed
general access (as opposed to selective access), the government is
encouraged to open up its property for speech to some extent rather
than not opening it up to speech at all.73 While on its face this reasoning might seem pragmatic, the focus on the government's subjective
intent results in circular reasoning that, in many cases, gives government unfettered discretion to block expressive activity.
Where a plaintiff argues that a space has been opened up as a designated public forum, the government can simply point to the fact that
it has excluded the plaintiff as evidence that it did not intend to open
the forum in the way the plaintiff says it should be open. As a result,
it becomes virtually meaningless to argue that the space is a designated public forum. In other words, "[t]he very fact that the Government denied access to the speaker indicates that the Government did
not intend to provide an open forum for expressive activity, and under
demonstrate that the fo[this form of] analysis that fact alone would
74
forum.,
public
[designated]
a
rum is not
As a result, under the traditional approach, the designated public
forum collapses into the nonpublic forum leaving two dichotomous
categories: the highly protected streets/parks/sidewalks category, and
the meagerly protected nonpublic forum. 75 Any viewpoint neutral
restriction 7 6 falling outside of the streets/parks/sidewalks category is
only subject to a type of rational basis review.77 Accordingly, in most
cases, the traditional approach provides adequate First Amendment
protection only to streets, parks, and sidewalks because all other
properties are nonpublic fora.78
2. Compatibilty Approach: A Balance of Interests
In contrast to the traditional model, the compatibility approach to
the public forum doctrine asks "whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at
71
72

Id.
Id. at 680.

73 Id.

74 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 825 (1985) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
71 See id. at 821.
76 The viewpoint neutrality requirement is discussed infra Part ll.C.
77 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 821 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
78 For an interesting discussion on this point, see Post, supra note 20, at 1745-59.
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a particular time., 79 Thus, the forum is determined by examining both
the method of the proposed expression (e.g., a silent vigil, as opposed
to a vocal picket) and the government's interest in placing restrictions
on speech in this particular location. Unlike the traditional approach,
where the Court looks at the history of the type of property at issue,
labels the forum, and then applies the applicable test, the Court, under
the compatibility approach, does not determine what forum the property fits under until after it balances the First Amendment interest
with the government's purported interest. After balancing the interests
to arrive at the applicable forum, the model then applies either a strict
scrutiny or reasonableness test to determine whether the restriction
passes constitutional muster. In this way, the outcome in a given controversy is determined, not by history alone, but by balancing the
competing interests at play. Because categories are defined by the
nuanced facts before the Court, advocates of this approach see public
forum doctrine, not as a rigid test, but as "analytical shorthand"80 or a
"heuristic device" 8' that assists the Court in balancing the government
interest with the First Amendment interest.
A good explanation of how the compatibility approach should
work is found in Justice Kennedy's concurring82 opinion in Lee v.
InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness:
If the objective, physical characteristics of the property at
issue and the actual public access and uses that have been
permitted by the government indicate that expressive activity
would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the
property is a public forum. The most important considerations
in this analysis are whether the property shares physical
similarities with more traditional public forums . . . and

whether expressive activity would tend to interfere in a
significant way with the uses to which the
government has as
83
afactual matter dedicated the property.
At the heart of Justice Kennedy's conception of the public forum
doctrine is the idea that the First Amendment cannot be guided by
79 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
80 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 820 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (interpreting the public forum

categories as nothing more than "analytical shorthand for the principles that have guided the
Court's decisions regarding claims to access to public property for expressive activity").
81Farber & Nowak, supra note 20, at 1234-35 ("[T]he public forum doctrine is a useful
heuristic device-a shorthand method of invoking this balance of interest. But when the heuristic device becomes the exclusive method of analysis, only confusion and mistakes can result.").
82 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
83 Id. at 699 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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historical formalism, but requires a respect for tradition coupled with
an understanding of modem reality. 84
3. The CompatibilityApproach vs. The TraditionalApproach:
And the Winner Is...
One way to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the traditional
approach and compatibility approach is to look at them in their
broader contexts. These two models are part of a larger debate about
how the courts should address constitutional questions. On one side of
the debate is the rules-based paradigm, 85 and on the other side is the
'consequential' approach.86 When placed in this broader context, the
traditional approach represents rules-based thinking, while the compatibility model represents consequential thinking.
a. Rules-Based Thinking: A Lens to Examine the Traditional
Approach to the Public Forum Doctrine
The rules-based approach, advocated by Justice Scalia, seeks to
answer constitutional questions through generalized rules laid down
by the Court. The two major arguments in favor of a rules-based
model are that this approach promotes predictability and that it constrains judicial subjectivity. 87 If a rule is set forth, people know what
to expect, and lower courts will be constrained to decide cases within
the parameters of the set forth rule. The question then becomes, how
should these rules be established? While Justice Scalia acknowledges
that it is "possible to establish general rules, no matter what theory of
interpretation or construction one employs, 8 8 in order to obtain the
advantages of the rule-based approach, he maintains that it is important to rely on a textual interpretation that adheres to an originalist
84 See id. at 697 ("[T]he policies underlying the doctrine cannot be given effect unless we
recognize that open, public spaces and thoroughfares that are suitable for discourse may be
public forums, whatever their historical pedigree and without concern for a precise classification
of the property.").
85 See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989).
86 See generally Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Constitution, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 245 (2002).
87 Scalia, supra note 85, at 1178-81. Justice Scalia also mentions the appearance of equal
treatment as an argument in favor of a rules-based model. Id. at 1178. He also acknowledges,
however, that "perfect justice can only be achieved if courts are unconstrained by such imperfect generalizations." Id. at 1177. This concession seems to cut against the notion that people
who are subject to general rules will necessarily feel as if they are being treated equally. If a rule
is set out that is well-suited to deal with the problem in Case A but applying that same rule
creates an injustice in Case B, it is hard to imagine that the losing party in Case B will feel that,
under the law, he was treated equally to the parties in Case A.
88 Id. at 1184-85 (emphasis omitted).
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theory of construction. 9 Without a textual originalist framework, the
rules-based approach appears to be more of a legislative process than
it does a judicial one. 9 The rules-based model, therefore, advocates
an exclusive focus on language, history, tradition, and precedent.
The traditional approach to the public forum doctrine takes on
many of the attributes of the rules-based model. The traditional model
narrowly focuses on an historical interpretation of which places have
traditionally been available for speech. Relying on the Hague dictum,
the model only provides a high level of speech protection to the three
places (streets, parks, and sidewalks) that were historically protected
at the time the Hague case was decided. Any place falling outside of
these historical spaces gets scant First Amendment protection. Under
rules-based reasoning, the traditional approach to the public forum
doctrine is desirable in that it creates a clear formula that constrains
judicial activism and creates predictable outcomes. But is rule-based
reasoning the only method that provides judicial restraint and
predictable outcomes? And even if it is, are these the most important
values in interpreting constitutional questions?
Justice Breyer argues that the rules-based approach is unsound insomuch as it does not accomplish the goals that its proponents advocate. Because the framers did not indicate the factors that judges
should focus on when interpreting the Constitution's "open language," the very idea that there is an objective, originalist theory of
construction is misplaced. 91 Because there is no objective method for
determining what the framers wanted, this approach is not effective in
reining in judicial subjectivity.9 2 Justice Breyer points out that
emphasis upon language, history, tradition, or prior rules ...
may simply channel subjectivity into a choice about: Which
history? Which tradition? Which rules? The literalist approach will then produce a decision that is no less subjective
but which is far less transparent than a decision that directly
addresses consequences in constitutional terms.93
Based on this view, the claim that the rules-based model is superior to
other models in promoting judicial restraint lacks merit.
Because subjectivity is not eliminated through use of the rulesbased approach, Justice Breyer also questions whether its proponents
89Id. at 1183-84.
90 Id. at 1185.
91Breyer, supra note 86, at 269.
92 Id. at 269-70.
93 Id. at 270.
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can claim that this model is a paragon of predictability. 94 Depending
on the subjective lens through which a judge interprets history, tradition, and rules, the outcome may differ in different cases. Again, the
95
question becomes, "Which history? Which tradition? Which rules?
The seeming advantages to the traditional approach to the public
forum doctrine begin to crack when held up to Justice Breyer's general critique of the rules-based approach. The Hague dictum and the
Davis case that it modified are both based on the notion that the First
Amendment is only a negative liberty-that is, that government has
no affirmative duty to make its property available for speech.96
Streets, parks and sidewalks were exceptions carved out of this general principle because of the idea that the people had acquired a
"First-Amendment easement" for these spaces. 97 From its very inception, then, the traditional approach to the public forum doctrine has
carried subjective assumptions about the meaning of the First
Amendment. The argument, therefore, that the traditional model constrains judicial subjectivity is misguided. The model begins from the
subjective premise that the First Amendment is, in most cases, a negative liberty.
A competing and equally viable argument is that when the language of the First Amendment is examined in the context of the rest
of the Constitution, it "also forms a necessary part of a constitutional
system designed to sustain

. . .

democratic self-government

. . .

by

encouraging the exchange of ideas needed to make sound electoral
decisions ....,98 This interpretation supports the view that the First
Amendment places an affirmative duty on government to make its
property available for expression. This is not to say that one view on
the First Amendment is necessarily preferable to the other. The point
is that the traditional approach is not as well suited to protect against
judicial subjectivity as it might first appear. It is laden with subjective
judgments about the proper meaning of the First Amendment.
b. ConsequentialThinking: A Lens to View the
CompatibilityApproach
The "'consequential' approach," advocated by Justice Breyer, examines constitutional questions in terms of value-based outcomes.
This requires judges to work towards outcomes that reflect "basic
94Id.
95 Id.

96 See supra Part ll.A.I.
97 Kalven, supra note 53, at 13; see also supraat Part II.A.1.

" Breyer, supra note 86, at 253.
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constitutional purposes" 99 with an eye toward the general constitu-

tional objective of promoting a "participatory democratic selfgovernment."' ° Justice Breyer's approach does not undervalue the
importance of history, language, tradition, and precedent-these are
still considerations of paramount judicial importance. These factors
must be considered by "emphasiz[ing] values underlying specific
constitutional phrases, see[ing] the Constitution itself as a single
document with certain basic related objectives, and assum[ing] that
the latter can inform a judge's understanding of the former."10' In this
way, one of the most important values underlying the Constitutionsustaining participatory democratic10 2 self-government-is at the forefront of any constitutional inquiry.
The consequential approach contains mechanisms that act as a
check on judicial subjectivity. Because the values that are considered
when reaching decisions under this model are the very values underlying the Constitution itself, there is a "limit[ation] on interpretive
possibilities." 10 3 Justice Breyer also points to "[a]n individual judge's
need for consistency over time," as another constraint on subjectivity.1°4 The need for consistency also acts as a mechanism to maintain
predictability. While this approach does not completely eliminate the
problems of subjectivity or unpredictability, the rules-based approach
is unable to eliminate these problems either. Even if the rules-based
approach might be somewhat more effective in acting as a judicial
constraint, Justice Breyer argues, "the constitutional price is too
high. 105
The compatibility approach to the public forum doctrine mirrors
many of the considerations inherent in the consequential paradigm.
Because "the First Amendment 'rests on the assumption that the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public,"" 6 the
compatibility approach does not dismiss a place as unworthy of full
First Amendment protection unless it determines that there is a
demonstrable reason to do so. The implicit question asked during the
balancing that takes place under the compatibility approach is, "how
will this outcome affect participatory democratic self-government?"
99Id. at 246-47.
1001d. at 248.
101Id. at 269.
Id. at 248.
102
03
1 Id. at 270.
104Id.
105
Id. at 249.

106
Stone, supra note 52, at 233 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945)).
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In this way, the compatibility approach addresses First Amendment
questions from a consequential, value-based perspective. Because
judges are constrained by the values underlying the Constitution and
by their need to maintain consistency, the compatibility approach
does not inevitably foster judicial subjectivism and unpredictability.
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the seeming advantages of
the traditional approach (predictability and judicial restraint) are not
as promising as they might first appear. First, the traditional approach
contains an inherent degree of judicial subjectivity and
unpredictability. Second, to the extent that the traditional approach is
able to rein in judges, the compatibility approach also contains checks
on subjectivity and predictability. If the traditional approach cannot
claim a monopoly on predictability and judicial restraint, the question
remains: which approach to the public forum doctrine rests on surer
constitutional footing?
c. How Do the Two Approaches Measure Up Against the Values
Underlying the FirstAmendment?
The public forum doctrine is not solely concerned with the First
Amendment; it examines First Amendment questions as they relate to
competing governmental interests. At the same time, the doctrine
arose specifically to address First Amendment questions. A judicially
created tool designed to analyze First Amendment questions that does
not adequately protect the values underlying the First Amendment is
unable to serve the function for that which it was intended. It follows
then that the utility of the public forum doctrine must, in large part, be
judged against how well it protects the values underlying the First
Amendment.
There are three generally accepted theories behind the purpose of
the First Amendment: (1) unrestrained expression creates an informed
citizenry as well as a more accountable and transparent government,
and therefore, free expression is indispensable to a healthy system of
democracy;1°7 (2) there is a marketplace of ideas and with full access
to ideas and information, the citizenry will arrive at some higher
truth; 10 8 and (3) the ultimate goal of democracy is to sustain a system
1

07See

ALEXANDER

MEIKLEJOHN,

FREE

SPEECH AND

ITS

RELATION

TO

SELF-

GovERNMENT, 15-16, 24-27, 39 (1948). "As the self-governing community seeks, by the
method of voting, to gain wisdom in action, it can find it only in the minds of its individual
citizens. If they fail, it fails. That is why freedom of discussion for those minds may not be
abridged." Ld.
at 25.
lO8See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that under the Constitution, "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas--that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
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composed of self-fulfilled individuals, and without freedom of expression, self-fufillment' °9 is impossible."o
None of these underlying values are supported or taken into consideration under the logic of the traditional public forum model. By
way of illustration, consider Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Lee
v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, in which the
Court determined whether LaGuardia and Kennedy Airports were
public or nonpublic fora.' Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the
government can restrict expression in airports, not because such expression unduly interferes with the primary function of airports, but
simply because "given the lateness with which the modem air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for the description of
having 'immemorially ... time out' of mind been held in the public
trust and used for purposes of expressive activity." ' 12 As Chief Justice
Rehnquist's explanation demonstrates, the traditional approach
effectively freezes public forum doctrine to the time of the Hague
dictum.
Because the traditional approach interprets First Amendment questions in a manner that effectively nullifies the prospect of a designated
public forum, all government property fits into two dichotomous
categories: the classic forum and the nonpublic forum.' 1 3 Since the
classic forum is reserved for a narrow category of locations that meet
the "time out of mind test," i.e., streets, parks, and sidewalks, all other
government property most likely fits into the nonpublic forum, and

tion of the market"). This philosophy was developed by Justice Holmes, who was inspired by
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1978) (1859).
109See David J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the
FirstAmendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974) ("[The significance of free expression rests
on the central human capacity to create and express symbolic systems, such as speech, writing,
pictures, and music, intended to communicate in determinate, complex and subtle ways.").
110Of course, one may reject the idea that the First Amendment is primarily concerned
with any of these theories but, instead, acts as a mere constraint on government actors. Under
this framework, it is easier to defend the traditional approach because the framework does not
operate under the assumption that more speech is necessarily better. See Lillian R. Bevier,
RehabilitatingPublic Forum Doctrine:In Defense of Categories, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 79. Under
this constraint theory, the goal of the public forum doctrine is not to "provide[] 'enough'
opportunities for citizens to speak." Id. at 81. Instead, the doctrine encompasses the more
modest goal of "reduc[ing] the systemic opportunitites for public forum regulators to abuse their
governmental power." Id. As a descriptive matter, this Note agrees that the traditional approach
is a product of this constraint theory and is, therefore, not concerned with providing more
opportunities for speech. Normatively, however, this Note rejects the constraint theory and is
premised on the idea that the First Amendment serves its purpose when government acts on an
affirmative duty to keep space open for speech purposes.
" Lee v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness Inc., 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
12Id. at 680 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
3
1 See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
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gets minimal First Amendment protection 14 Why should the First
Amendment only have force in streets, parks, and sidewalks? As Justice Kennedy succinctly put it, "The right of speech protected by the
[public forum] doctrine ... comes not from a Supreme Court dictum
but from the constitutional recognition that the government cannot
impose silence on a free people."' 15
When the value of free expression turns on whether it occurs in a
location that was used for expression over half a century ago,
important messages and ideas are kept from the public discourse.
This, in turn, undermines the health of democracy, distorts the
marketplace of ideas, and, for those whose voices are silenced,
hinders the ability to achieve self-fulfillment. In many communities,
streets, parks, and sidewalks have been usurped by other public
locations as areas where members of the public congregate." 6 But
despite this phenomenon, the traditional approach's strict reliance on
the Hague dictum is unable to take these changes into account.
The compatibility approach does a far superior job in bringing just
resolutions. Simply put, there is no way to uphold the promises of the
First Amendment without critically examining and balancing the
competing rights at stake in a given case. By restricting speech on
government property only when necessary, we ensure a stronger
democracy through our ability to obtain information and arrive at
truth. In addition, the American value of self-expression is nourished
rather than unduly hampered. The compatibility approach reinforces
our democratic principles because it restricts speech only when there
is a demonstrable justification for the restriction.!17
Advocates of the traditional approach and the compatibility
approach have widely divergent views about what values the public
forum doctrine represents and how it is to be applied. But one
principle both sides agree on is that no matter what the forum, the
state may not restrict speech on the basis of the viewpoint of the
speaker. This is what is known as the viewpoint neutrality
requirement.

4

See supra Part lI.B.1.
505 U.S. at 696 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
" See id. at 697-98 (explaining that in the United States "where most citizens travel by
automobile, and parks all too often become locales for crime rather than social intercourse, our
failure to recognize the possibility that new types of government property may be appropriate
forums for speech will lead to a serious curtailment of our expressive activity").
7
1 See Post, supra note 20, at 1765-67 (explaining that the compatibility approach's "logic
begins from the constitutionally congenial premise that the state should not suppress speech
unless there is a good reason to do so").
1

15Lee,
6
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C. Public Forum: The Viewpoint Neutrality Requirement
Governmental viewpoint discrimination is indisputably intolerable
under the First Amendment. The Court has been clear that viewpoint
discrimination is not to be taken lightly. For example, in Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,'18 the Court found that a
federal charitable giving program was a nonpublic forum, and the
restrictions that prevented the petitioner groups from participating
were reasonable. 1 9 Nonetheless, suspicious that the government's
restriction could be a cover-up for viewpoint discrimination, the
Court remanded the case for further findings on the viewpoint
discrimination question. 120 What is viewpoint discrimination and why
is it so offensive to the First Amendment?
Essentially, viewpoint discrimination occurs where the
government restricts the expression of one point of view on a subject
while allowing expression of an alternative point of view. Texas v.
Johnson121 provides a classic example of viewpoint discrimination. In
Johnson, the defendant was charged under a criminal statute
outlawing flag burning. 22 The Court held that the statute was
inconsistent with the First Amendment, in part, because the state
government was promoting "its own view of the flag by prohibiting
expressive conduct relating to it."' 23 Where the government outlaws
an expression opposing patriotism while allowing the flag to be used
to promote patriotism, it is engaging in viewpoint discrimination.
The public forum doctrine developed out of the Court's
recognition that, in some instances, government could make contentbased restrictions.1 24 What is the difference between viewpoint-based
restrictions on speech (which are never permissible) and contentbased restrictions (which, under the public forum doctrine, are
permissible under specified conditions)? One interpretation is that
content-based restrictions deal with "the government's ability to
choose 'the subjects that are appropriate for public discussion,'
whereas viewpoint [based restrictions] relate[] to discrimination
'among viewpoints on those subjects.' ' 1 25 Distinguishing contentbased restrictions from viewpoint-based restrictions can be
118473 U.S. 788 (1985).
at 813.
19Id.
2

1 0d. at 812-13.
121491 U.S. 397 (1989).
22

1 1d. at 400.
123
Id. at 415.
24

1 See supra Part H.A.

25Post, supra note 20, at 1751 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 59, 61 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).

1168

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:4

challenging because, while, on the one hand, the concepts are distinct
(subject based vs. viewpoint based), viewpoint-based restrictions are
also a subset of content-based restrictions. In Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of the University of Virginia,126 the Court discussed the
difference between content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions in
the context of public forum analysis, and why it finds viewpointbased restrictions more dangerous than content-based restrictions:
It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate
speech based on its substantive content or the message it
conveys . . . . When the government targets not subject
matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject,
the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.
Viewpoint discriminationis thus an egregiousform of content
discrimination.The government must abstain from regulating
speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion
or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction.

• . . Thus, in determining whether the State is acting to preserve the limits of the forum it has created so that the exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, we have observed a
distinction between, on the one hand, content discrimination,
which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of
that.. •forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against
speech otherwise within the forum's limitations.127
Viewpoint-based restrictions are, thus, a more dangerous category of
content-based restrictions.
From the marketplace of ideas perspective 128 and the system of
democracy perspective 1 29 it may be difficult to reconcile the
distinction between content-based restrictions and viewpoint-based
restrictions. Both types of restrictions keep information out of the
marketplace of ideas and inhibit the public's ability to express its
democratic will. For example, a restriction that forbids discussion
about illegal drugs could be defined as content-based as opposed to
viewpoint-based in that the entire subject is off limits for discussion.
126515 U.S. 819 (1995).
127Id. at 828-30 (emphasis

added) (citations omitted).
supra note 108 and accompanying text.
129See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
'28 See

2006]

NO JOY IN MUDVILLE FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT

1169

But what is the practical result of such a restriction? Because
information and ideas are kept out of the marketplace, the public is
inhibited from making reasoned choices about what it believes to be
the proper course of action with respect to drug policy. If this is a
subject which has an effect on what kind of government leadership
the public wants to support, but the public is unexposed to different
ideas on the subject, then this significantly undermines the public's
ability to express its will through its choice of political representation.
On the other hand, viewpoint-based restrictions are arguably more
dangerous in that they distort the marketplace by allowing some
viewpoints on a given subject while keeping others out. Viewpoint
restrictions give the state the power to regulate in its own self-interest
by enabling it to excise views inimicable to a position it wishes to
promote. In this way, there is more of a concern that when
on viewpoint, a censorial
government restricts speech based
130
afoot.
be
may
motive
governmental
The Court's position appears to be that content-based restrictions
do not distort the marketplace of ideas in the same manner as do
content-based
with
Because,
restrictions.
viewpoint-based
restrictions, an entire subject is off-limits for discussion, one
viewpoint on the subject is not able to flourish in the absence of
others. While there is a strong argument that the practical effects of
content-based restrictions are no less dangerous to First Amendment
principles than are viewpoint-based restrictions,131the Court clearly
finds viewpoint-based restrictions more offensive.
Because of the profound effect viewpoint discrimination has on a
democratic society, courts must rule close cases on the side of finding
a restriction unconstitutional. This remedial approach errs on the side
of curbing speech restrictions. Preventing the government from acting
as a censor by closing off different viewpoints is at the heart of the
First Amendment. On the other hand, what is lost if the courts unduly
hamper government from restricting speech on government property?
This may mean that government cannot, in some cases, conduct its
business as efficiently as it would prefer. But while "[t]he First
i30Professor Post points to language in Cornelius indicating that the Court's primary

concern was that the restriction might have derived from an improper, censorial motive. In
Cornelius, "the Court speaks of viewpoint discrimination as regulation 'based on the desire to
suppress a particular point of view,' or as founded on 'a bias against the viewpoint advanced by
the excluded speakers,' or as 'impermissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a particular point
of view."' Post, supra note 20, at 1824 (emphasis added) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 812-13 (1985)).
131See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 828-30; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
391 (1992) ("In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even beyond mere content
discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination.").
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Amendment is often inconvenient . . . [i]nconvenience does not
absolve the government of its obligation to tolerate speech.4 32 To
vigilantly ensure that government does not act as a censor, the courts
must scrupulously review speech restrictions for viewpoint
discrimination, always erring on the side of protecting speech.
III. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: WHERE DID THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Go WRONG?
Part II has argued that the only way the public forum doctrine can
serve the values underlying the First Amendment is by taking a
compatibilty approach that scrupulously eschews viewpoint
discrimination. The Gateway case is, unfortunately, a good
illustration of what not to do with the public forum doctrine. As a
result of this decision, an area of land spanning twenty-eight acres of
downtown Cleveland that reaches an audience of "tens of thousands.., on a regular basis, ' 33 is unnecessarily cut off as a place to
discuss issues that impact the collective identity of a large
metropolitan community. Further, this case sets unsettling precedent
for others who wish to express messages on public property not
falling under the streets/parks/sidewalks paradigm, but property that
is, nonetheless, compatible with speech. By relying on the traditional
public forum framework, and by erroneously determining that
Gateway's speech restrictions were not enforced in a viewpoint
discriminatory manner, the Sixth Circuit has taken a step backward in
ensuring that the public will have the opportunity to get the
information necessary to function as a healthy democracy.
The Gateway case involved a separate First Amendment
examination of the Gateway sidewalks and the Commons. 134 The
court's analysis of the sidewalks is interesting and subject to
criticism, 135 but it is the court's terse treatment of the Commons that
reveals the more pressing problems inherent in misapplying the public
132Lee v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness Inc., 505 U.S. 672, 701 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
133United Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp., 383 F.3d 449, 451 (6th Cir.
2004).
134To remind the reader, the Sixth Circuit assumed state action in this case. Although it is
not entirely clear whether Gateway is a private actor or a state actor, the court started its analysis
under the assumption that Gateway was a state actor. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
135The court found that, under the public forum doctrine, the Gateway sidewalks were a
classic public forum. Using the public function doctrine, the court found that even if the Gateway sidewalks were privately owned, Gateway was still subject to the strictures of the First
Amendment. The court remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether the speech
restriction, as it pertained to the Gateway sidewalks, was a reasonable time, place and manner
restriction. Gateway, 383 F.3d. at 452-55.
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forum doctrine. A separate examination of the court's use of the
traditional model and its treatment of the viewpoint discrimination
question will elucidate the harms caused by the court's approach.
A. Use of the TraditionalModel
The Commons area is "an assortment of plazas, grassy areas, and
interior streets within the [Gateway] Complex." 136 The protestors
argued that the Commons was a designated public forum. 137 Gateway
(standing in the government's shoes) countered that the Commons
was a nonpublic forum and that the restrictions on protest were in the
interest of efficient traffic flow, safety, and crowd control. 138 The
Sixth Circuit's explanation as to how it would address the arguments
started out with some promising language. The court explained its use
of public forum analysis "as a means of determining when the
government's interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended
purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for
other purposes."' 139 This language appears to embrace a compatibility
model; that is, the court seemed concerned with balancing the First
Amendment right with the purported government interest of traffic
flow, safety, and crowd control. But then, in analyzing the question,
the court proceeded to apply a traditional, property-based model.
While no one argued that the Commons fit into the classic streets,
parks, and sidewalks category set forth in the Hague dictum, 14° there
was compelling evidence that peaceful protest was compatible with
the uses of the Commons. Gateway allowed other signs and banners
into the Commons during the same time periods that it refused to
allow the anti-Chief Wahoo signs into the Commons. 14 1 If Gateway
allowed people with signs and banners expressing a message
supportive of the team, there is no reason similar signs with different
messages would interfere with traffic flow and safety, unless the
problem was that it might cause people to be upset by the message.
I36
Id. at 453.
137 Id.

139Final Brief of Defendant-Appellee Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp. of Greater Cleveland at
42, Gateway, 383 F.3d 449 (No. 01-3434).
139Gateway, 383 F.3d. at 451-52 (emphasis added) (quoting United Food & Commercial
Workers Local 1099 v. City of Sidney, 364 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2004)).
14'This seems as though it could have been a viable argument given the park-like features

of the Commons and the fact that it also encompasses streets that are public thoroughfares.

Perhaps UCC chose not to argue this position because it was trying to encourage the court to set
precedent in the Sixth Circuit favorable to the compatibility approach. Arguing that the Commons fell into the Hague dictum would have encouraged the court to speak in terms of tradition
rather than compatibility. Unfortunately, the court chose to talk in terms of tradition all the
same.
141Gateway, 383 F.3d at 453.
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This, however, would not be a sufficient reason to ban the protestors'
message, because government cannot restrict speech on the basis that
some people might be disturbed or offended. 142 Given the fact that
similar signs with different messages have not interefered with traffic
flow and safety, there was no reason why the protestors' signs would
be incompatible with the forum.
Not only did the court ignore the plaintiffs' compatibility
arguments, it did not even attempt to make an inquiry into the
compatibility question. Instead, the court narrowly focused on
Gateway's intent in opening up the Commons. The court determined
that the Commons was not a designated public forum because "to the
extent that Gateway has allowed non-ticket-holders to access the
Commons during gametime, it has done so only for those interested in
the actual game being played, and has done so for the specific
purpose of contributing to the gametime ambience.' ' 143 This focus on
Gateway's "specific purpose," or subjective intent, creates circular
reasoning that negates the prospects for finding a designated public
forum under the traditional model.' 44 The Commons, therefore, is a
nonpublic forum and is subject to only the most meager of First
Amendment protection. Under this approach, once the government
has turned away a speaker, it has indicated its intent, and because its
intent controls, the First Amendment challenge is doomed to failure.
The use of the traditional approach in this case underscores the
approach's inherent deficiency-it does not give a court the ability to
take the values underlying the First Amendment into account when
analyzing a First Amendment issue. To the extent that the approach
can be defended on its ability to rein in judicial subjectivity and
unpredictable outcomes, 145 the consitutional price is simply too high.
Had the court applied the compatibility approach, there would
have been a serious question as to whether the protestors' message
was being unduly restricted from the Commons. Even if it had turned
out that the speech was incompatible with the forum and that the
restriction on speech was justified, we would at least know that
expression was being hampered only because the court believed there
was a legitimate reason to do so. With the court's reasoning, all we
know is that Gateway does not intend to have this expression take

142See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.").
143Gateway, 383 F.3d at 453 (emphasis added).
I44 See supranotes 66-78 and accompanying text.
145This is a dubious contention. See supra Part I.B.3.a-b.
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place in the Commons. This tells us nothing about whether it should
be allowed to restrict this expression in the Commons.
B. Viewpoint Discrimination
The Sixth Circuit's analysis of the viewpoint discrimination
question is the most troubling part of the opinion. The protestors
argued that Gateway's practice of allowing people with signs
supportive of professional sports into the Commons, while at the
same time blocking those with signs that were critical of racial
caricatures in professional sports was unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination. 146 This seems like a tenable position: one view
(supporting the status quo in professional sports) is allowed in, while
an opposing view (rallying against the status quo) is kept out.
However, by framing the issue more narrowly, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that Gateway was not engaging in viewpoint
discrimination. The court reasoned that the threshold requirement for
being allowed access to the Commons was to "have an interest in the
Indians' performance on the field."' 147 The court distinguished the
protestors' message by arguing that "in marked contrast, [the
protesters] do[] not seek access to the Commons for purpose of fan
enjoyment. Rather, [they] wish[] to make a political statement that is
merely incidental to the game itself."'' 48 The court's reasoning
continues, "[t]hat Gateway has allowed baseball fans access to the
Commons falls far short of suggesting that it has allowed everyone
access to the Commons." 49 In other words, according to the court,
Gateway has only opened up the forum to talk about the enjoyment of
sports. It is permissible to express a message in support of the
Indians' opponents (like the New York Yankees), so there is no
viewpoint discrimination.
Simply put, this rationale is hard to swallow. Gateway is
preventing those who want to make a "political statement" from
entering the Commons because they have a view about professional
sports that is different from those who support the endeavor. Signs
bearing the inscription "Go Tribe"1 50 that display depictions of Chief
Wahoo are not only endorsements of the team but are, in effect,
endorsements of the use of the team name and symbol. Futhermore, it
takes a real stretch of the imagination to believe that the name and
146See

Proof Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants the United Church of Christ, Reverend Ronald

Fujuyoshi, Gary Quarles & Juan Reyna at 35-36, Gateway, 383 F.3d 449 (No. 01-3434).
147 Gateway, 383 F.3d at 453.
148Id.

149Id.
150"Go

Tribe" is a familiar slogan used in Cleveland to express support for the Indians.
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mascot of the team are "merely incidental to the game itself."15'1 The
discussion about the name and symbol of the city's team are easily
part of the broader discussion about professional sports, which has
been allowed into the forum. People who bring Chief Wahoo signs
into the Commons are instantiating an endorsement of the mascot as
well as the team it represents; the protestors are trying to express the
view that they are against the ideology this mascot represents. The
fact that Gateway allows viewpoints in support of the team and its
mascot while barring critical viewpoints on the same subject is classic
viewpoint discrimination.
To the extent that the Sixth Circuit's framing of the viewpoint
discrimination issue is tenable, close calls should be decided on the
side of the First Amendment. The court's narrow characterization of
the relevant topics available for discussion in the Commons has a far
different impact than would the remedial approach advocated in this
Note. The court's view essentially gives Gateway the ability to
engage in censorship on, what the court conceded to be, public
property. As a result of this decision, core political speech is kept out
of the marketplace of ideas.
CONCLUSION

Public forum analysis allows the courts to deal with a complex
issue in a manageable fashion. However, if the courts misapply the
doctrine, serious damage can be done to the interests and values
protected by the First Amendment. If content-based restrictions are to
be tolerated in some circumstances (which is essentially what the
public forum doctrine concedes), then the court must not allow speech
restrictions on government property unless two conditions are met.
First, the court must be able to fully explicate why, after balancing the
competing interests, there is a strong and sensible reason to restrict
the speech in light of the purported government interest. Second,
there must be no question that the government is not favoring one
viewpoint over another and engaging in censorship of controversial,
political messages.
This Note has argued for a compatibility approach that examines
questions of viewpoint discrimination with a fine tooth comb.
Unfortunately, with this decision, the Sixth Circuit has steered a
course away from protecting the values underlying the First
Amendment. The fact that Gateway has allowed signs into the
Commons which endorse Chief Wahoo and the name the Indians,
151Gateway, 383

F.3d at 453.
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while at the same time, turning away those signs taking a different
position, demonstrates two critical points. First, carrying signs is
compatible with the forum because signs generally do not interefere
with traffic flow and safety. Second, the restriction was enforced in a
viewpoint discriminatory manner. Even if, applying the compatibility
approach, the Sixth Circuit had been able to justify a position that the
Commons was a nonpublic forum, the court still should have found
that Gateway's practice of excluding the speakers was viewpoint
discrimination. Therefore, the court should have found that the
restriction was an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech. If the
courts are to continue to talk about the First Amendment in terms of
public forum, they should support a model that truly protects the
values underlying freedom of speech.
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